modest offerings of the masters. Thus Wordsworth seems to have been more literally influenced by the psychological system of David Hartley-a second-rate manthan by the great English philosophers in whom his system was grounded. Coleridge was more dazzled by the ambitious structures of Plotinus and Schelling than by the severe rationalism of Aristotle and Kant. And in his speculations on the evolution of life, the writer on whom he drew most extensively was a disciple of Schelling, Henrik Steffens. Steffens was a scien tist so unimportant that you will not find his name in standard histories of the evolution theory, or of geology, which was his special branch. But thanks to Schelling and the "deductive" method, he was able to give Coleridge a more comprehensive view of scien tific principles than any sober sc ientist could do.
Emerson, again, while he had a speaking acquaintance with all the great names in philosophy', derived his chief inspiration. from second-rate thinkers, from Sweden borg and Boehme, from Plotinus and the " Zoroastrian Oracles," and-from Coleridge. Emerson was a man of great intellectual candour, and he frankly acknowledged that certain authors were read by him not so much to get to the bottom of a subject as for the "lustres" which they shed upon it for his imagination. The books which probably influen ced him most profoundly in fhe years when he was preparing to write his little treatise on Nature were Coleridge's Friend and Aids to Reflection. The first of these, in particular, is largely responsible for Emerson's general philosophy of science, with its rather precarious grounding in "idealism." And while Emerson invariably wrote like an angel, we must conclude that his nature-philosophy was a loose and popular rendering of Coleridge, who was a loose and popular rendering of Schelling, who-for all his magnificen t show of dialecticwas no better than a Kan t run wild.
One of the most curious chapters in the development of a poet's mind is the process by which Emerson arrived at his transcendental version of the theory of evolution. And here again, his opinions were not formed primarily by the great scientific evolutionists, Buffon, Lamarck, Saint-Hilaire, and Darwin, but by a succession of secondrate, popular, and more or less dubious authorities. And the first of these was Coleridge.
Much has been made, by literary critics, of passages in certain English poets-Coleridge, Tennyson, Browning, Emerson-which, long before the publication of The Origin oj Species, suggest the doctrine of evolution. Bu t a close examination will often show that these poets did not have in mind the theory of the" transmutation of species" (to use Lyell's term for it). What they had in mind was often merely the concept of a "graduated scale of being" in the organic world. This was a concept widely held by scientists and philosophers in the eighteenth century and earlier, many of whom had not a tincture of the modern evolutionary views. I t was held by Leibnitz, Locke, and Kant, by Sir Matthew Hale, and other theological writers, by Lessing, Herder, Bonnet, Robinet, Buffon, Goethe, Lamarck-not to speak of the poets Pope, Akenside, and Thomson-associated, or not associated, with the" transmutation of species." I t was held by Schelling and Steffens, and was taken over from them by Coleridge To the modern reader this sounds much like the evolu tionary doctrine of Lamarck. Bu t Coleridge means nothing of the sort. He is not talking of the origin of species. He more than once repudiated the notion that man is derived from any lower animal form, or that any animal species is derived from another. He is simply enunciating the traditional doctrine of the scale of being, which he might have found in such a perfectly orthodox work as Matthew Hale's Primitive Origination oj Mankind. In considering this notion, we must always bear in mind that it may be held in several distinct ways. (I) It may be held in connection with the theory of the" transmutation of species," with the understanding that the "higher" forms have been derived from the lower by natural means such as those set forth by Lamarck and Darwin. (2) It may not imply evolution at all in this· sense, bu t still be thought of as a series of events in chronological sequence; life being regarded historically as later in appearance than inorganic matter, and the higher forms of life as following the lower in a graduated scale of ascent. (3) It may not even imply chronological . sequence, or take in to accoun tat all the ques tion of successive appearance in time. The several orders of living beings are then ranged from lowest to highest as a matter of classifica tion., by way of showing the unity of plan which runs through the whole of na ture.
Lyell, in his Principles of Geology (1830-3) repudiates with almost equal firmness the first and second views listed above. He believes · neither in the" evolution of one species out of another," nor in the chronological succession of higher and higher forms of being. The most that he admits is "the unity of plan that nms through" the system of vertebrated animals. Browning, in Parace/sus (1835), admits the second and third views, including the unity of plan running from inorganic matter up to man's spiritual life and the historical sequence in this graduated ascent. This is apparently the position of Tennyson, too, in the cancelled stanzas of The Palace of Art (1833) . There is nothing to show that these poets did not agree with Lyell in ascribing each new species to a special act of creation, rather than assume a "transmutation of species."
In Schelling and Steffens and Coleridge the evolution of the successive stages of being is worked ou t in an elaborate systematic way. But they are writing not as Table  Talk Coleridge's somewhat sentimental repudiation of the theory of man 's descent from a lower animal form:
Look at that head of Cline, by Chantrey! Is that forehead, that nose, those temples, and that chin, akin to the monkey tribe? No, no. To a man of sensibility no argument could disprove the bes tial theory so convincingly as a quiet con· templation of that fine bust.
In the long run, however, Coleridge's condemnation of the "bestial theory" would make less impression than his accoun t of how "the animal rises" in the "scale of being." And so was planted the seed of what in the end was to flower as the evolutionary faith. But it was a long time in flowering.
In 1830 Emerson read Lee's Life oj Cuvier and was impressed with the great anatomist's fourfold classification of the animal kingdom . But he noted rather ruefully, I think, that Cuvier took no stock in the Coleridgean "scale of beings," though he did recognize an intimate inter-connection among organized forms.
It is clear that Cuvier gave no encouragemen t to the view that one species may be derived from another by "transmutation." Nor did any other of the scientific writers read by Emerson during the years 1830-4. One of the most important of these was Dr. John Abernethy. Emerson's attention had been drawn to the" grand conception" of John Hunter by Coleridge's discussion in The Friend; and he seems to have studied with care the lectures in which Abernethy expounded Hunter's" theory of life." In these lectures Emerson would find more than one reference to the "great chain of living beings, which seems to connect even man with the common matter of the universe." But this he would find in combination with an express statement that" each link in the chain is perfectly independent of the other."
In investigating this part of the works of Nature, the multiplication of the species, we perceive, as in other instances, the same uniformity of design, and diversi ty of means; the same gradation, and seeming concatenation in their series. Yet this concatenation, though delightful and interesting to our observation, is perplexing to OU f understanding; for each link of the chain is perfectly independent of the other, nor does any necessity for such series and order, or seeming connection appeal'. Still, however, it produces on the mind effects similar to those whi ch are derived from viewing a highly fini shed picture, wherein the shades and variety of light and colour are so softened down and blended together, that it is difficult to say where the one ends and the other begins .
Abernethy was obviously troubled by his own inability to find more than aesthetic significance in the "concatenation" of animal forms. But it never occurred to him to in terpret it genetically by reference to the origin of species.
Much the same position is occupied more than ten years later by Sir Charles Bell in his treatise on The Hand, its Mechanism and vital Endowments as 'evincing Design (r833) . This book was read by Emerson in the year of its publication, and the entries in his 'Journal show that he was much impressed by it. Bell, who had been a professor in the Royal College of Surgeons, was of the Abernethy faction in the dispute between "vitalists" and" mechanists," as we should call them to-day. He deprecates the materialistic and irreligious disposition of mind so often found among distinguished naturalists. In this connection he makes allusion to the theories of Lamarck, without mentioning him by name. He does not take stock in this view, "that new organs have been produced by a desire and consequen t effort of the animal to stretch and mould itself." And he cannot believe in the unbroken uniformity of natural laws, at least in the animal world, but must resort to the notion of the special creation of separate species.
Emerson, then, found in Bell no more countenance for the theory of evolution than in Cuvier and Abernethy. But he did find what he had found in Coleridge and laid much to heart, the notion of a "progressive system" in nature, and that of "an anticipating or prospective intelligence," as well as the notion (not found in Coleridge) of the immensities of time in which nature has carried on her opera tions.
There is extreme grandeur in the thought of an anticipating or prospective intelligence: in reflecting that what was finally accomplished in man, was begun in times incalculably remote, and antecedent to the great revolutions which the earth's surface has undergone. Nor are these conclusions too vast to be drawn from the exami nation of a part so small as the bones of the hand; since we have shown that the same system of parts which constitutes the perfection of that in strument adapted to our condition, had its type in the members of those vast animals which inhabited the bays, and inland lakes of a former world.
The animals referred to in the last sen tence were the prehistoric Saurians -Plesiosaurus, I chthyosauruswhose paddles, or anterior extremities, according to Bell, show us the" immediate changes from the foot of animals to the fin of the fish."
This striking example of the similarity of organ in animals of the most diverse kind and period greatly struck the imagination of Emerson. And he reproduced it, together with the pious moral drawn by Bell, in a lecture delivered in Boston in December, 1833, on "The Relation of Man to the Globe." In this lecture he speaks of the factthe most surprising, I may say the most sublime, that man is no upstart in the creation, but ha. s been prophesied in nature for a thousand thousand ages before he appeared; that, from times incalculably remote, there has been a progressive preparation for him, an effort to produce him; the meaner creatures con taining the elements of his structure and pointing at it from every side . ... Hi~ limbs a.re only a more exquisite organization-say rather the finis h-of the rudimental forms that have already been sweeping the sea and creeping in the mud; the brother of his hand is even now cleaving the Arctic sea in the fin of the whale, and innumerable ages since was pawing the marsh in the flipper of the saurian.
This has often been cited as evidence that Emerson had accepted the theory of evolution. Such a conclusion is quite unwarranted. The thought is taken bodily from Bell, who does not dream of the evolutionary hypothesis. It is simply proof of "an anticipating or prospective intelligence" at work in nature.
What inspired Emerson to give his 1833 lectures on natural history was an experience more vivid than any book could be, since it came to him through an ocular view of the facts of nature systematized. This was his visi t in July to the Museum in the Paris 'Jardin des Plantes. Here he found before his very eyes the several animal forms graded from lowest to highest in the scale. How much he was impressed is shown by his entry in his 'Journal:
The universe is a more amazing puzzle than ever, as you glance along this bewildering series of animated forms,-the hazy butterflies, the carved shells, the birds, beasts, fishes, insects, snakes, and the upheaving principle of life, everywhere incipient, in the very rock aping organized forms. Not a form so grotesque, so savage, nor so beautiful but is an expression of some property inherent in man the observer,-an occult relation between the very scorpions and man. I feel the centipede in me,-cayman, carp, eagle and fox. I am moved by strange sympathies; I say continually " I will be a naturalist."
Considering the background of Emerson's reading and though t, there is no reason to find an evolu tionary pronouncemen t here. There is nothing here that is not in Coleridge, in Abernethy, in Bell, except the poetic quali ty of the expression, the" strange sympathies," the" occult relation;" and these are perhaps more mystical than scientific in imaginative reference. We may say of the man who wrote this passage that he was ready for the theory of evolution, but not that he had embraced it.
Even in Nature, published three years later, there is nothing specifically evolutionary. What Nature expresses, on the side of scientific theory, is Emerson's sense of the want of any real explanation of the natural process. What he has to teach more positively are the Coleridge doctrines,-the values of creative ideas in scien tific thought, the distinction between Reason and Understanding ascri teria of truth, the ideali ty of the outer world, and the correspondence between the outer world' and the world of our though t or spiri t. These are the main subjects of commen t in his Journal between 1833 and 1840. The visible creation ... cannot, must not ... be anything but the exterior circumference of the invisible and metaphysical· world) and material objects are necessarily kinds of scoriae of the substantial thoughts of the Creator .. , . For God to create is only to show. The universe in its minutest details exis ted for God as reaJly before the creation, as after it; because it existed in him substantially, as when the statue exists in the block of marble from which the sculptor extracts it .. , . No fibre in the animal, no blade of grass in the vegetable, no form of crystallization ill inanimate matter, js without its clear and well-determined correspondence in the moral and metaphysical world .... Thus Emerson finds support for his fa vouri te doctrine of the universe as "the externization of the soul" (or of God, as he has it in the 'Journal version) .
In September,J836, Nature was published and off its author's hands. But he went on writing about nature and science. And what he has to say now is mu ch more pertinent, from a scientific point of view, than anything he said before the publication of his book. The reason for this is unmistakable. He has been reading Lyell. There are several en tries in September and October of 1836, and a highly significant passage in his lecture on "The Humanity of Science," delivered in December, all bearing testimony to the impression made by Lyell.
The significant feature of the first entry is the naming of Saint-Hilaire. Emerson may have heard of the French scientist in Paris or London in 1833 ; but it is most likely that he was first impressed wi th what Lyell said of him:
M. Geoffroy St. Hilaire has declared his opinion, that there has been an uninterrupted succession in the animal kingdom, effected by means of generation from the earliest ages of the world up to the present day, and that the ancient animals whose remains have been preserved in the strata, however different, may nevertheless have been the ancestors of those now in being. This notion is not very generally received, but we are not warranted in assuming the contrary, without fully explaining the data and reasoning by which it may be refuted .
Here was a stimulating and comprehensive theory which fitted the condi'tio'ns Emerson had set up for a scientific Idea; and while Lyell did not consider it well-grounded, we can well understand how it would have impressed Emerson and led him to include Sain t-Hilaire in his list of frui tful scien tific thinkers.
One October entry is significant for the mention of Lamarck and the somewhat loose and sketchy statement of his theory. He appears along with Goethe and Newton as examples of" this invincible tendency of the mind to unify."
The system of Lamarck is an imperfec t result of the same force. It aims to find one monad of organic life which shall be the common element of every animal, and becoming an infusory, a poplar-worm, or a man according to circumstances. It says to the canker-worm, "How dost thou, Brother? Please God you shall yet be a philosopheri" Lyell gives quite an extended account of Lamarck's theories, but the sentences which probably suggested this fanciful flight of Emerson are the following:
This nature is daily engaged in the formation of the elementary rudiments of animal and vegetable existence, which correspond to what the ancients termed spontaneous generation. She is always beginning anew, day by day, the work of creation, by forming monads, or "rough draughts" (",bauches), which are the only living things she gives birth to directly.
There are distinct primary rudiments of plants and animals,
and probably of each of the great divisions of the animal and vegetable kingdoms. These are gradually developed into the higher and more perfect classes by the slow bu t unceasing agency of two influential principles ....
Emerson's entry in his 'journal was transferred bodily, with slight modifications, to his December lecture on "The H umanity of Science." One scholar somewhat uncritically speaks of the time" when Emerson lectured on evolution in 1836." Judging by the outline of the lecture given by Cabot, this interpretation is unjustified. Emerson's subject was" the humanity of that spirit in which nature works," and Lamarck was offered merely as an example of the" tyrannical instinct" which impels the mind" to reduce all facts to a few laws, to one law."
There is no reason to say that Emerson had adopted the . theory of Lamarck. Having in mind Lyell'sjudgment of it as unsound, Emerson specifically characterizes it as "an imperfect result of the same force." The utmost we can say is that in 1836 Emerson's imagination had been impressed with Lamarck's concept as an interesting sci en tific theory. Bu t once this seed was lodged in his mind, it was bound to sprout. Emerson had no such theological grounds as Coleridge for fighting shy of the "bestial theory." The doctrine of the fall of man meant nothing to him-on the contrary. His theology was of the most nebulous and accommodating order. As the years went on, he became more and more case-hardened by NeoPlatonism and every form of Oriental "idealism" against the assaults of any objective fact whatsoever. His mind was one in which con traries lived happily together in a sort of benign solution. That is the note of Transcenden talism. He was exposed to scien tific influences which Coleridge did not encounter. Moreover, was it not his own revered Coleridge who had first fired his imagination with the thought of an ascending scale of life, and even talked of how irritability was "evolved out of the growth," and sensibility out of irritability? A mere Emerson could not be expected to distinguish, like Coleridge, between a purely logical evolution and an actual "historical" process.
The transition from the scale-of-being phase of Emerson's thought to the strictly evolutionary phase was made by insensible degrees; and it is perhaps doubtful whether he himself was aware of what was taking place. In 1841, in his oration on "The Method of · Nature," and in the poem, Woodnoles, his expressIOns are a shade more evolutionary than in any earlier utterance. In r844, in his essay on Nature, he is severaL shades more evolutionary:
Now we learn what patient periods must round themselves.
before the rock is formed; then before the rock is broken, and the first lichen race has disin tegrated the thinnest external plate into soil, and opened the door for the remote Flora, Fauna, Ceres, and Pomona to come in. How far off yet is the trilobite! how inconceivably remote is man! All duly arrive, and then race after race of men. It is a long way from granite to the oyster; farther yet to Plato and the preaching of the immortality of the soul. Yet all must come, as surely as the first a tom has two sides.
.
In this year appeared that scandal-rousing book, Vestiges oj the Natural History oj Creation, probably wri'tten by Robert Chambers. Of Chambers's work Darwin said, "the writing and arrangement is certainly admirable, but his geology strikes me as bad, and his zoology far worse." The book contains, at any rate, an elaborate statement and defence of the theory of evolution. It is the most plausible and comprehensive view of evolution that Emerson had ever encountered. But so familiar was this way of thought by then that it caused him neither shock nor excitement. The only thing that bothered him was the perfunctory piety with ' which the au thor tried to gild the pill for his religious readers:
Vestiges oj Creation. What is so ungodly as these polite bows to God in English books? He is always mentioned in the most respectful and deprecatory manner. ... But courage only will the spirit prompt or accept. Everything in this Vestiges of Creation is good, except the theology, which is civil, timid, and dull.
From now on Emerson's 'Journal entries show a more marked evolutionary cast. Not long after the notice of the Vestiges, we have the most uncompromising declaration Emerson was ever to make that man is a child of earth:
The master can do his great deed, the desire of the world,-say to find his way between azote and oxygen, detect the scent of the new rock superposition, find the law of the CUfves,-because he has just come out of Nature, or from being a part of that thing .... He knows the laws of azote because just now he was azote. Man is only a piece of the universe made alive.
The next book which deeply affected Emerson's views of nature was by a now forgotten writer, the GermanAmerican journalist, Johann Bernhard Stallo. It was apparently in r849 that Emerson read Stallo's General Principles oj the Philosophy of Nature (Boston, r 848) . Stallo had a vigorous philosophical mind, and gives, I
think, an acceptable resume of the systems of Schelling and Hegel, with some account of Kant and Fichte, and of "Oken's system of nature." From his book Emerson probably learned more of German metaphysics than from any other reading; it is from this time on that we ' have the most frequent references to Schelling and Hegel, as well as to Oken, Saint-Hilaire, and other evolutionary naturalists. The evolutionism that Emerson found in Stallo, however, was rather vague and transcendental. He writes in his 'Journal of "Schelling's aper~u" (the word is Stallo's) and its later forms in Oken, Hegel, etc.: "The idea was that the form or type became transparent in the actual forms of successive ages as pres en ted in geology." That is the nearest Emerson comes in these years to a statemen t of the theory of evolution .
In his direct quotations from Stallo there is one very in teresting, if Clbscure, expression: "The development of all individual forms will be spiral." This is evidently 4 8 9 the notion Emerson wished to express in the motto added to Nature in 1849:
A subtle chain of countless rings The next unto the farthest brings And, striving to be man, the worm Mounts through all the spires of form.
But the main reflections of Emerson after reading Stallo are in line with his favourite notion of the creative Idea and his equally favourite" idealism."
The Origin oj Species passed without notice. Either Emerson's attention was not drawn to this epoch-making book; or else, after Chambers and Stallo, it made no particular impression upon him. Beside the high and mystical discourse of German idealists, mere objective science was perhaps too dry for Emerson. In 1873 he notes: "Darwin's Origin of Species was published in 1859, but Stallo, in 1849, writes, 'animals are but foetal forms of man.''' This oracular utterance is of more import to ' the Concord sage than the ranged and sifted evidences of natural selection.
The wri ting of Emerson which most strikingly suggests the theory of evolution is found in a lecture, first delivered in 1854, and brought to its final form in two lectures on "Poetry and Imagination" delivered in 1872. By the year 1854 he had been subjected to every importan t influence tha t was to mould his sci en tific ou tlook, and this is the sum of his philosophy of nature. The following passages are the most significant: First innuendos, then broad hints, then smart taps are given, suggesting that nothing stands still in Nature but death; that the creation is on wheels, in transit, always passing into something else, streaming into something higher ; that matter is not what it appears;-that chemistry can blow it all into gas ....
EMERSON AND EVOLUT10N
The ends of all are moral, and therefore the beginnings are such. Thin or solid, everything is in flight. 1 believe this conviction makes the charm of chemistry,-that we have the same avoirdupois matter in an alembic, without a vestige of the old form; and in animal transformations not less, as in grub and fly, in egg and bird, in embryo and man; everything undressing and stealing away from its old into new form, and nothing fast but those invisible cords which we call laws, on which all is strung.
[Thought] has its own polarity. One of these vortices or s. elf-directions of thought is the impulse to search resemblance, affinity, identity, in all its objects, and hence our sclence, from its rudest to its mos1 t refin· ed theories. The hardest chemist, the severest analyzer, scornful of all but dryest fact, is forced to keep the poetic curve of Nature, and his result is like a myth of Theocritus. All multiplicity rushes to be resolved into unity. Anatomy, osteology, exhibit arrested or progressive ascent in each kind, the lower pointing to the higher forms, the higher to the highest, from the fluid in an elastic sack, from radiate, mollusk, vertebrate, up to man; as jf the whole animal world were only a Hunterian museum to exhibit the genesis of mankind, ldentity of law, perfect order in physics, perfect parallelism between the laws of Nature and the laws of thought exist. ln botany we have the like, the poetic perception of metamorphosis,-that the same vegetable point or eye which is the unit of the plan t can be transformed at pleasure into every These paragraphs illustrate extremely well the insensi ble degrees by which Emerson passed from the progressive-developmen t phase of thought to the strictly evolutionary. In this lecture, Emerson's constant theme is the familiar one of identity of law in nature. The first paragraph is a restatement of Coleridge's scale-ofbeing paragraph in Aids to Reflection, and much of the rest harks back to his essays on method in The Friend. The only paragraphs in which the evolutionary implications are marked are the two beginning with "the electric word pronounced by John Hunter." There is nothing in Coleridge about the electric word, "arrested and progressive development." Nor apparently can it be found in Hunter. In his 'Journals, however, Emerson refers to the phrase" arrested development" as occurring in Vestiges oj Creation. And, indeed, we do find in Cham bers references to the development of animals being arrested, and in connection with theories of Hunter. There are also in Chambers the usual references to " pregressive forms in the development of individuals" and to " the succession of animal forms in the course of time."
So that Emerson found here the words "arrested," "progressive," and "developmen t" all used together in connection with old John Hunter. And his "grand conception" takes on, under Chambers's wand, evolutionary implications which it did not have for Hunter himself nor, certainly, for Coleridge.
Saint-Hilaire had taken on evolutionary implications in Lyell, which were reinforced by Chambers and Stallo. In the meantime, Emerson had come on the theories of Lorenz Oken, a follower of Schelling but a true evolutionist in a queer sort of way. He is particularly known for his theory of the origin of life in the Ur-Schleim. Emerson's "fluid in an elastic sack" refers perhaps to the" infusoria," or microscopically minute bladders with a fluid content, which make up the primary sea-slime of Oken's theory. In 1831 Emerson regarded the theory of spon taneous generation (or" equivocal generation") as a scientific humbug. But his views had presumably altered since reading Chambers and Stallo.
Of the o'ther scientists in his list, the only certain evolutionist is Darwin. But Emerson now, presumably, read them all in the light of evolution,-the only light which, in the long run, makes sense out of their discoveries and classifications. The theory of evolution, like its predecessor and parent, the theory of progressive development, had now come to be the supreme example of what he had all along been seeking in natural history,-"iden ti ty of law, perfect order in physics, perfect parallelism between the laws of nature and the laws of thought." The later theory completed the other, and was now indistinguishable from it. And in listing its proponents, he did not try to distinguish between those who prepared the ground for evolution and those who occupied its advanced position.
It was Emerson's Transcendentalism that made it possible for him to accept evolution without a qualm. His fluid theology put up none of the resistances that Coleridge's did to the" bestial theory." But it was also his Transcendentalism that prevented him from drawing from evolution the conclusions that Swinburne and Meredith drew or making the applications which are made by all thorough-going naturalists. Whatever the origins of Transcendentalism, it fed on what it found congenial, and confirmed itself by appeal to the N eo-Platonists, to Sweden borg, to the Indian and Persian sages. As he goes on, Emerson's idealism becomes more and more self-assured. The more he learns of natural history, the more certain he is that it is all a projection of the mind, an expression of the inherent moral purpose of the universe which is found in the human spiri t.
Thus in the years following his reading of Stallo, we find him laying down propositions like this: "That Nature works after the same method as the human imagination. That Nature makes flowers, as the mind makes images .... That organic matter, and mind, got from the same law, so correspond." On the basis of Stallo he distinguishes three eras in men's attitude towards nature: the Greek era, when they deified nature; the Christian, when they looked on· na ture as an evil; and the Modern, which began in reaction against" the too idealistic tendencies of the Christian period"-but "now the tendency is to marry mind to Nature, and to put Nature under the mind, convert the world into the instrument of Right Reason."
This sounds very fine,-converting the world in to the instrument of Right Reason; but it appears in suspicious company, with the idea of putting nature "under the mind." What is involved here may be no more than a matter of emphasis. But it is true that Emerson almost invariably views nature all too blandly through the eyes of the" mind," reading it in the light of "innate ideas" and all the hoary preconceptions of "idealism:'· Almost never does it occur to him that the mind may have sometHing to learn from nature, from the world which it finds given to it from wi thou t. Thi s is the secret of his fondness for Sweden borg and Hegel, as well as Schelling, in this later period. In 1854 he writes, "This age is Swedenborg's" because of our determination to "repudiate the Hebrew ideas, and embrace the subjective philosophy of the Saxons, that the soul makes its own world." As for Hegel, Emerson finds his form of evolutionism attractive because in it the "unfolding" is an unjolding oj nature jrom the mind:
Nature is brute, but as this [unity with mind] animates it,-only a language, a noun, for the poet. Nature always the That Hegel's dogma had anything to do with the strides made by natural science is extremely doubtful. Science made its great strides, in the nineteen th cen tuey, as in the eighteenth, seventeenth, and sixteenth, by the cool and patient application of the inductive method, by bold experiment and hypothesis constantly controlled by observation. Science goes on under any metaphysic that will leave it alone. But it was an emotional necessity for Emerson to suppose that an idealistic metaphysic was essen tial to good science. This is the reason why he never rightly understood the implications of evolution,-that man, being, as Emerson once made bold to say, "only a piece of the universe made alive," has everything to learn from the universe, the world of things-about nature, about himself, his own mind, his moral being, and his very spirit. Emerson was so anxious to ,read ethical meanings into nature that he never stopped to inquire where man got these ethical concepts. He took for granted that they are somehow given a priOl';: eternally inherent in the intellectual system of the universe. He never glimpsed the idea that ethical concepts may be themselves the product of evolution, and that consequently, in appraising them, something may be learned by studying the condi tions under which they came in to being. This is why his very ethical system is provincialinadequate to the appraisement of a Goethe, for example. It is provincial because it is arbitrary and traditional, because it has not been put through any process of rational criticism. It is infinitely less suited to meet the conditions of men living in society than the Renaissance system of Goethe. I recognize that the Transcendentalists were religious and ethical liberals. Their liberalism was a great solvent of dogma. But it was not critical and radical because it . had too exclusively emotional and roman tic a cast. Their ethical ideals were at once "eternal" and vague; whereas the ethical ideals of naturalism are both relative and precise, being the acknowledged product of human needs in contact with social and material conditions.
There can be no question of the historical importance of the Transcendental movement. Human nature being what it is, it was an absolutely necessary step in the transition from supernaturalism to naturalism. Without it these religious and sensitive souls would have altogether foundered, and civilization would have suffered more damage than it has. Under cover of Transcendentalism naturalism was enabled to make great advances. But the Transcendentalists did not themselves develop the possibilities of naturalism. They approached things from the wrong side. They lost themselves in the fogs of mysticism. They followed after strange gods. In Emerson, to employ the electric word of John Hunter, naturalism suffered an "arrested development."
